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Rating Actions: Reliable Information or Regulatory Constraint 
after the Subprime Crisis? 
 
Eleonora Isaia, Marina Damilano, Cristina Rovera1  
 
At the time of the subprime crisis, investors strongly blamed 
credit rating agencies (CRAs). Six years later, we want to verify 
if CRAs are still suffering a reputational damage by measuring 
stock prices reactions to rating announcements. To test our 
hypothesis we conduct an event analysis on the American, EU 
area and Asian/Pacific stock markets over a ten-year period 
from November 2003 to November 2013. We find that the post-
crisis abnormal returns are in general lower if compared with 
the pre-crisis level, in particular if rating changes are far away 
from the speculative-junk border. 
 
JEL Codes:  JEL: G12, G14 and G24. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the time of the subprime crisis, investors strongly blamed credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
for failing in evaluating the credit risk of collateralized securities and, more in general, the 
probability of default of issuer companies, giving misleading, if not wrong, signals to the 
market. Therefore, in this paper we want to verify if CRAs are still suffering a reputational 
damage by measuring stock prices reactions to rating announcements. Our assumption is 
that, if the market is still considering rating agencies unable to produce additional and 
reliable information, it should not react to rating actions or react less than before the 
subprime crisis.  
 
We adopt a global perspective and test our hypothesis with an event study on the biggest 
fifty stocks of the American, European and Asian markets, over a decade from November 
2003 to November 2013. We then analyse 1455 rating events, quite a large sample 
compared to other studies on the same topic. Distinctive feature of this work is the aim of 
better understand whether the impact of the subprime crisis on credit ratings’ credibility 
changes in different times, immediately after the Lehman bankruptcy as well as years 
later. In fact, the market could have a short memory and, after a while, forget the past, or 
remain impressed by extraordinary events and never forgive the responsible agents. 
 
As known, rating agencies play a fundamental role in the financial market. They contribute 
to reduce information asymmetry by providing information on the creditworthiness of 
issuers and, at the same time, they are the cornerstone of banking and financial 
regulations. As a result, market participants are forced to use credit ratings, despite their 
effective information content and their accuracy. Therefore, to capture the market 
reactions to rating announcements actually driven by investors behaviours and not by 
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regulatory requirements, we observe the abnormal returns of those transactions far away 
from to the speculative-junk border, where trading is free and not substantially affected by 
prudential rules, and we compare these outcomes with the abnormal returns to rating 
changes close to the border and thus compulsory driven by regulatory constraints. 
 
We find that the post-crisis market reactions are in general lower if compared with the pre-
crisis level, in particular when ratings are far away from the threshold, i.e. where the 
market activity is not contaminated by prudential rules. With these findings we aim to 
contribute to the current debate on the role that rating agencies still have and should have 
at the light of one of the most severe financial crisis of the last century. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Beside section 1 that contains the introduction, section 
2 presents the literature review, section 3 describes the methodology and the data sets, 
section 4 discusses our main findings and finally section 5 draws the conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The literature on rating is extensive. One branch of the scientific literature deals with the 
conflict of interest related to the rating agencies. Our paper, instead, pertains to another 
branch of the literature. It focuses on the market responsiveness to rating changes. The 
work of Gonzalez, Haas, Johannes, Persson, Toledo, Violates, Wieland and Zins (2004) 
offers a literature review of the effects of ratings on market dynamics. Further in-depth 
analysis on the topic can be found in the works of Katz (1974), Hand, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1992), Followill and Martell (1997), Liu, Seyyed and Smith (1999), Steiner and 
Heinke (2001), Ammer and Clinton (2004), Linciano (2004), Martell (2005), Afonso, Furceri 
and Gomes (2012), Grothe (2013) who claim that downgrades have, on average, a greater 
impact than upgrades have. Although many papers test the market reactions to rating 
changes of bond, stock and CDS markets in different geographical areas and across the 
subprime crisis, quite a few try to gauge the reputational damage suffered by the rating 
agencies during and after the crisis. With respect to previous works on the same topic, the 
present analysis tries to move forward going more deeply inside the long crisis and, at the 
same time, considering the potential influence of the regulatory constraints on the market 
activities. In fact, the length of the crisis is subdivided in sub periods, to isolate the most 
severe phenomena immediately after the Lehman collapse, and the market reactions to 
rating agencies is observed close to or far away from the investment-speculative 
threshold, to capture the influence of the regulatory constraints.  
 
The parameters on the basis of which a rating is determined are investigated in the works 
of Norden and Weber (2004), Micu, Remolona and Wooldridge (2006), Steiner and Heinke 
(works previously quoted), Opp C., Opp M., and Harris (2005), Jorion and Zhang (2006), 
Hill, Brooks and Faff (2010), Arezki, Candelon and Sy (2011), Iannotta, Nocera and Resti 
(2013), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013). 
 
Norden and Weber have proved whether S&P, Moody's and Fitch can or cannot convey 
new information to the market. Steiner and Heinke give instead great importance to the 
security issuers’ country, while Arezki, Candelon and Sy dwell upon the type of 
announcement and upon the issuer agency. Jorion and Zhang maintain that the market 
response might also depend on the value of the rating preceding the announcement. With 
the help of empirical tests, the authors demonstrate greater price changes when low 
ratings are issued. Iannotta, Nocera and Resti insist on the opacity of negotiation 
procedures, reducing in this way the explanatory power of ratings and the interpretation of 
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results, while Bar-Isaac and Shapiro dwell on the economic cycle under way, by observing 
its countercyclical trend over the ratings quality: lower ratings accuracy in boom times and 
higher accuracy in recessionary times. 
 
3. The Methodology  
 
The sample consists of 1455 rating revisions from November 1st 2003 to November 1st 
2013. The type of rating actions taken into consideration are restricted to S&Ps, Fitch and 
Moody’s issuer rating, long term issuer default and outlook, with positive and negative 
watches, if there. Rating actions and all the data have been extracted from the Bloomberg 
database. In order to standardize the conventional alpha-numerical scales used by the 
three CRAs, we covert their ratings into a single numerical scale that goes from excellent 
to poor: AAA (or similar) is equal to 1, while B- (or similar), which is the lowest rating of our 
sample, is equal to 16. The positive and negative watches are equal to -0,25 and +0,25 
respectively. 
 
Our analysis considers the 150 most representative companies in the American, Euro 
zone and Asian/Pacific markets selected by using the components of the following blue-
chip regional indexes: STOXX USA 50, EURO STOXX 50 and STOXX Asia/Pacific 50. 
The time frame has been split into three shorter sub-periods, in order to gauge the impact 
of the sub-prime mortgages financial crisis on the reliability of rating agencies: 
 
a) pre-crisis (01/11/2003-15/09/2008, Lehman Brothers bankruptcy); 
b) crisis (i.e. the peak of the crisis, 16/09/2008-15/10/2009, when the Vix index returns 
to the pre-crisis mean level); 
c) post-crisis (16/10/2009-01/11/2013). 
 
The main characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1. The table shows a 
prevalence of downgrades (584) compared to upgrades (462). Moreover, it can be noted 
how 32% of downgrades is contaminated, i.e. affected by an earlier rating revision 
occurred in the previous month, compared with 18% of the upgrades. 
 
For what concerns the composition of the sample by the category of the issuer company, 
about 2/3 of rating events involve non-financial firms (which represent 76% of the firms in 
our sample), with an almost consistent distribution between downgrades and upgrades, 
while financial companies (including banks) show an imbalance in favor of downgrades. As 
a consequence of the markets turmoil originated by the sub-prime crisis, most of the 
downgrades (65%) were recorded in the years following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 
while the same percentage refers to the upgrades in the pre-crisis period.  
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Table 1 – Classification of rating events (November 1st  2003 – November 1st 2013) 
  Downgrade Upgrade Outlook Other 
events (a) 
Total 
  By rating agency 
Fitch 160 93 78 46 377 
Moody's 175 111 118 30 434 
Standard & Poor's 249 258 106 31 644 
Total 
  of which: 
584 462 302 107 1455 
-  contaminated 187 83 162 25 457 
-  anticipated by  watch 111 54 - - 165 
  By category of the issuer company 
Financial companies 
  of which: 
227 132 79 18 456 
- banks 144 83 45 8 280 
Non-financial firms 357 330 223 89 999 
Total 584 462 302 107 1455 
  By  period of time 
Pre-crisis 202 298 45 60 605 
Crisis 124 26 16 19 185 
Post-crisis 258 138 241 28 665 
Total 584 462 302 107 1455 
  By geographical area 
USA 200 123 91 42 456 
Euro zone 
  of which: 
275 202 114 34 625 
- Belgium 0 3 3 2 8 
- Germany 69 50 36 7 162 
-  Spain 63 37 9 1 110 
- France 72 68 44 20 204 
- Ireland 4 3 3 1 11 
- Italy  61 28 11 0 100 
- The Netherlands 6 13 8 3 30 
Asia 
  of which: 
109 137 97 31 374 
-  Australia 43 32 28 12 115 
- Hong Kong 3 4 6 2 15 
- Japan 63 97 57 17 234 
- Singapore 0 4 6 0 10 
Total 584 462 302 107 1455 
Notes: (a) Other events include ratings confirmed, deleted or with developing watches. 
 
Considering now the geographical areas, the sample has been divided into 477 
observations related to companies listed in Euro zone markets, 323 related to American 
issuers and 246 related to Asian companies located in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong or 
Singapore. However, the cross-analysis of sub-samples portrayed in Table 2 shows a 
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greater incidence of downgrades in the United States during the peak of the financial crisis 
(2008-2009) and referred to financial and banking companies only. 
 
Table. 2 – Distribution of rating events by sub-samples 
  US 
Downgrades Upgrades 
Financial 
companies 
-of 
which: 
banks 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Financial 
companies 
-of 
which: 
banks 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Pre-crisis 26 11 56 27 17 55 
Crisis 45 27 15 4 2 3 
Post-crisis 29 18 29 4 1 30 
  EU 
Downgrades Upgrades 
Financial 
companies 
-of 
which: 
banks 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Financial 
companies 
-of 
which: 
banks 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Pre-crisis 9 6 84 35 24 86 
Crisis 20 10 23 3 2 11 
Post-crisis 74 58 65 22 15 45 
  ASIA 
Downgrades Upgrades 
Financial 
companies 
-of 
which: 
banks 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Financial 
companies 
-of 
which: 
banks 
Non-
financial 
firms 
Pre-crisis 1 1 26 26 17 69 
Crisis 5 2 16 1 1 4 
Post-crisis 18 11 43 10 4 27 
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of rating events by the category of investment grade versus 
speculative grade. Data show the obvious predominance within the sample of companies 
with a good credit quality (observations that fall within the investment grade category are 
1090 and represent 97% of the total number of events, excluding outlooks). In the present 
analysis, the Euro zone stands out for the largest number of events registered in the rating 
grades known as "border" (between the BBB+ /Baa1 rating classes and BB-/Ba3).  
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Table 3 – Distribution of rating events by category: investment vs. speculative grade 
  Investment 
grade 
Speculative 
grade 
Total  
of which: 
current 
rating 
border 
 
of which: 
current or 
last rating 
border 
By  time span 
Pre-crisis 525 22 547 127 156 
Crisis 157 1 158 32 33 
Post-crisis 408 5 413 98 116 
Total 1090 28 1118 257 305 
 
By geographical area 
USA 338 8 346 40 52 
EU 500 3 503 142 168 
Asia 252 17 269 75 85 
Total 1090 28 1118 257 305 
 
In conclusion, one comment on the distribution of rating events per year. Figure 1 
represents the evolution of the total number of observations - highlighting the number of 
events with positive or negative watch in a separate bar -, distributed by downgrade, 
upgrade and outlook. 
  
Fig. 1 – Distribution of rating events per year (November 2003 –November 2013) 
 
 
To test our hypothesis, i.e. to verify if CRAs have suffered and are still suffering a 
reputational damage by measuring stock prices reactions to rating announcements, we 
conduct an event analysis on our sample. Thus, for all stocks under revision, we calculate 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over a [-1;+1] day window around the rating event, 
following the CAPM and estimating Beta over a 500-day window. Then, we conduct a 
multivariate OLS regression: our dependent variable is the absolute value of the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return, ABS_CAR, following Grothe (2013), as we want to analyze 
the size and not the sign of the market reaction. The independent variables are detailed in 
table 4.  
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In line with previous works on the topic, they are mainly related to: the crisis/post-crisis 
period, the type of rating action, the market condition, the nature of the issuer company 
and the geographical area. The first key issue of our research is the time period. On the 
basis of our hypothesis, we expect market reactions to rating changes to be lower in the 
post-crisis then in the crisis and pre-crisis periods. In fact, if investors do not longer rely on 
rating announcements or, at least, rely less than in the past, they do not immediately trade 
the security under revision. Therefore, the expected sign of the DUMMY_POST CRISIS is 
negative, indicating a lower expected abnormal return or, in other words, a reduced market 
impact of rating actions after the subprime crisis. This phenomenon is expected to be 
stronger in the banking and financial sectors and reflected in a positive coefficient for the 
DUMMY_FINANCIAL.  
 
The second key issue of this research is to sterilize the market activity from the influence 
of the certification role of rating agencies. To this end, we introduce two dummies, border 
and no-border, to separate the market-induced trading from the regulation-induced trading 
around the investment-speculative threshold, and we interact these two variables with the 
post-crisis variable. The expected sign of the BORDER-POSTCRISIS is uncertain, as the 
mandatory regulation displays a significant impact on the market activity, whether or not 
investors believe in rating announcements. On the contrary, the expected sign of the 
NOBORDER-POSTCRISIS is negative, signaling the loss of credibility and reliability 
suffered by rating agencies during the crisis. We then use two control independent 
variables, the VIX index and the STANDARD DEVIATION of each security, whose signs 
are expected to be positive: the higher the volatility of the stock and/or the market, the 
bigger the abnormal return. 
 
Finally, we use geographical variables for the US, EU and ASIAN markets included in our 
sample to verify whether CRAs’ reputational damage is delimited to the United States or 
spread with the same intensity all over the world. In regards to the European stock market, 
as the global financial crisis has turned into the sovereign debt crisis, we add a temporal 
dummy to capture the SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS impact for those countries of your 
sample (Ireland, Italy, Spain and France) affected by this additional domestic instability.  
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 Table 4 – Independent variables of the OLS regression  
Name Definition 
Expected 
sign of the 
coefficient 
DUMMY_CRISIS 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for all rating 
actions between September 15, 2008 and October 
15, 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
? 
DUMMY_POSTCRISIS 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for all rating 
actions after October 15, 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
- 
VIX 
Value of the VIX index on the announcement day of 
the rating action. 
+ 
DEVST 
Standard deviation of the 50-day daily returns 
preceding the rating action for the specific stock 
under revision. 
+ 
DUMMY_FINANCIAL 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the rating 
action concerns a financial company and 0 
otherwise. 
+ 
BORDER_POSTCRISIS 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the rating 
action is in the post-crisis period and concerns a 
company whose last or current ratings are between 
BBB+ and BB- (speculative-junk grade border) and 
0 otherwise. 
? 
NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the rating 
action is in the post-crisis period and concerns a 
company whose last or current ratings are not 
between BBB+ and BB- (speculative-junk grade 
border) and 0 otherwise.  
- 
WATCH_POSTCRISIS 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the rating 
action is in the post-crisis period and consists in a 
credit warning instead of a downgrading or 
upgrading and 0 otherwise. 
- 
DUMMY_US 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the rating 
action concerns an American company and 0 
otherwise. 
- 
DUMMY_EU 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the rating 
action concerns a Euro area company and 0 
otherwise. 
- 
DUMMY_EU2_CTRY_ 
SOVCRISIS 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the rating 
action concerns a Euro area company involved in 
the sovereign crisis (Ireland, Italy Spain, and 
France) and 0 otherwise. The Euro area sovereign 
crisis period has been defined from April 1, 2010 to 
December 31, 2012. 
+ 
 
4. The Findings 
 
Findings are summarized in table 5. If we first focus on the entire sample, column (1) 
shows that ABS_CARs are bigger when the market and the stock itself are more volatile, 
as well as during the peak of the crisis period. Nevertheless, it has to be noticed that in our 
sample we have some abnormal observations (defined based on 3 standard deviations of 
the standardized residuals), equivalent to 1 per cent of the sample, quite a reasonable 
number if we consider that we analyze the biggest financial crisis of the last century. To fit 
our model to these data, we use a dummy variable for each of them, even if we do not 
include their coefficients and P-values in table 5. All of them have a positive sign and a 
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statistical significance at 1 per cent level. Therefore, outlier observations display a strong 
explicative power.  
 
In column (2) we add some independent variables in order to improve the estimation 
model and better evaluate the market reaction to rating announcements during the post-
crisis period. To this end, we use three interaction variables, NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS, 
BORDER_POSTCRISIS and WATCH_POSTCRISIS, and we include the 
DUMMY_FINANCIAL. In line with our research question, the absolute value of abnormal 
cumulative returns are lower if compared with the pre-crisis level for those ratings far away 
from the speculative-junk border, where the market activity is not contaminated by 
regulatory constraints. On the contrary, the market reaction around the threshold is not 
significant and does not exhibit any difference with respect to the pre-crisis period. Credit 
warnings seem to maintain their informative power, as generally proved in literature, even 
if this evidence is not confirmed in the further sub-sample analysis and almost always is 
not significant. The DUMMY_FINANCIAL has a positive coefficient and is statistically 
significant indicating that financial firms have been experienced higher abnormal returns 
than non-financial companies both in the crisis and post-crisis periods. This result confirms 
our expectations, since banks and financial firms have been swamped by the long wave of 
Lehman collapse. 
 
Column 3 restricts the sample only to banks and confirms that rating agencies lose their 
informative power and/or their credibility when they do not display their certification role. In 
fact, the negative sign and the significant P-value of the NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS  show 
that the market reaction far from the borderline is lower than in the pre-crisis period. The 
same result, i.e. the lower market reaction compared to the pre-crisis span, is obtained 
around the critical threshold, but in this case it is not statistically significant. Furthermore, 
DUMMY_US indicates that the negative impact of the subprime crisis on the rating 
agencies reliability is stronger in the US stock market. 
 
Then, we test the same model of column 2 on the financial and non-financial sub-samples. 
Results are omitted, but they confirm lower CARs in absolute value in the no-border 
market activity in the post-crisis years, even if the evidence is weaker for non-financial 
firms suggesting that rating agencies might have suffered a stronger reputational damage 
in the banking and financial sector. 
 
Finally, columns (4) to (6) compare the three different geographical areas. Each regression 
confirms our main finding, that is NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS with negative sign and 
statistical significance. In the EU sub-sample – column 6 – the effect of the subprime crisis 
on rating agencies credibility is mixed with the impact of the sovereign crisis, that scattered 
on the so called Euro2 countries. Nevertheless, the DUMMY_EU2_CTRY_SOVCRISIS 
does not display a significant explicative power suggesting that deeper investigation is 
needed. We will take it into consideration in the further steps of our research project.  
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Table 5 - Explicative variables of the ABS_CAR  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Entire 
sample 
Entire 
sample 
Sub- 
sample 
BANKS 
Sub-
sample 
US 
Sub-
sample 
EU 
Sub-
sample 
ASIA 
C 
0.006 
(1.987) 
0.003 
(0.882) 
-0.002 
(-0.698) 
0.000 
(0.042) 
0.004 
(1.053) 
-0.011 
(2.221) 
DUMMY_CRISIS 
0.014*** 
(2.978) 
0.012** 
(2.042) 
0.017 
(1.270) 
0.014 
(1.185) 
0.006 
(0.821) 
0.005 
(0.538) 
DUMMY_POST 
CRISIS 
-0.003** 
(-2.305) 
     
VIX 
0.0007*** 
(3.760) 
0.000*** 
(3.737) 
0.001** 
(2.214) 
0.001** 
(2.300) 
0.000* 
(1.654) 
0.002* 
(1.656) 
DEVST 
0.294*** 
(2.361) 
0.210 
(1.501) 
0.629** 
(2.382) 
 
0.719*** 
(3.001) 
0.444 
(1.656) 
NOBORDER_POST 
CRISIS 
 
-0.007*** 
(-3.291) 
-0.012** 
(-2.091) 
-0.009** 
(-2.391) 
-0.007** 
(-1.856) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.919) 
BORDER_POST 
CRISIS 
 
0.002 
(0.817) 
0.001 
(0.936) 
-0.011* 
(-1.777) 
0.001 
(0.323) 
0.001 
(0.183) 
WATCH_POST 
CRISIS 
 
0.005 
(1.638) 
0.001 
(0.804) 
-0.002 
(-0.874) 
0.000 
(0.087) 
0.019*** 
(2.659) 
DUMMY_FINANCIAL  
0.006*** 
(2.898) 
 
0.005* 
(1.663) 
0.002 
(1.023) 
-0.005** 
(-2.140) 
DUMMY_US   
-0.010** 
(-1.995) 
   
DUMMY_EU2_CTRY_ 
SOV_CRISIS 
    
0.002 
(0.714) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.79 0.46 0.87 0.35 0.65 
N. observation 1452 1117 213 346 503 268 
The t-stat are reported in brackets under each coefficient. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance. * = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; ***= significant at 1% level 
with a two-tailed test. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The paper presents an event analysis on 1455 observations to test whether credit rating 
agencies’ reliability has been undermined by the subprime crisis. Our key assumption is 
that if the market reacts to any unpredictable and reliable information - such as a credit 
rating should be -, the stock under revision should register an abnormal return in the event 
window around the rating change announcement. In the same way, if ratings are no longer 
considered trustworthy and do not produce valuable information, the market should not 
react or react less than before. As rating agencies have been widely perceived to be one 
of the main contributors to the global financial crisis, we then expect a loss of their 
credibility in the post crisis period. 
 
In line with previous works on the same topic, we consider the big distinction between the 
informative power and the regulatory function of CRAs and we select a decade across the 
subprime crisis. Nevertheless, in addition to the current body of literature that generally 
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divides the period of time in before and after the crisis, just considering a precise reference 
point such as the date of the beginning of the crisis or the Lehman bankruptcy, in this 
paper we test the reputational damage in different periods of time. To reinforce our 
assumption, we isolate years 2008-2009, which represent the peak of the crisis, from 
2010-2013 and test whether the reputational damage has been progressively dried up 
since the Lehman collapse. The findings of the analysis seem to prove the effectiveness of 
our research question: credit rating agencies have suffered a reputational damage after 
the subprime crisis. In fact, abnormal returns in the post-crisis period are significantly lower 
than in the pre-crisis, at least for those transactions far away from the investment-
speculative border, where trading is not strongly driven by regulatory constraints.  
 
Our main funding is consistent even when we look at the sector subsamples and 
geographic subsample. In fact we can affirm that, in the banking and financial sectors as 
well as in the United States where the crisis was born, the phenomenon is stronger and 
shows that the faith on rating agencies’ capacity to gauge credit risk has been undermined 
by the subprime crisis scandals. The market seems to have quite a good memory and 
does not longer blindly believe in rating announcements like before the crisis. 
Nevertheless the banking regulation entrusts the credit risk valuation to rating agencies, 
allowing CRAs to maintain their power and to condition the market. The so-called paradox 
of credit ratings is one more time confirmed.  
 
New rules on credit rating agencies have been implemented after the subprime crisis to 
reinforce the regulatory framework, improve the quality of rating process, and reduce the 
overreliance on credit ratings and the power of CRAs. All these measures should have 
persuaded the market to restore confidence in credit ratings as truthful and neutral piece of 
information. A complete analysis of these rules and regulations is well beyond the purpose 
of this paper. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to analyze whether the impact of new 
regulations has produced a positive effect on CRAs reputation and cleaned up the 
reputational damage arisen from the subprime crisis. Unfortunately, the range of the 
regulatory measures is too recent to be evaluated on our sample.  
 
We could overcome this limit of our analysis extending the observation period, as well as 
we could improve the robustness of our findings, investigating separately abnormal returns 
in downgrades and upgrades subsamples. At this stage of the analysis, we analyze the 
size and not the sign of market reactions to rating changes, since we are interested in the 
market movement itself and not in its direction. Previous works often show that the market 
reacts more strongly to rating downgrades and credit watch than to rating upgrades. Thus, 
a further step to be done is an in depth-analysis to assess the degree of this credit market 
information asymmetry.  
 
Endnotes 
 
*This paper belongs to a larger research project on rating actions undertaken by the University of Torino, 
Italy. Findings are presented in two working papers: Isaia-Damilano-Rovera (2014) and De Vincentiis-Pia, 
Aftermath of the subprime crisis: reputational damages suffered by major and minor rating agencies, (2014), 
that focuses only on the banking sector and compare the reputational damage suffered by major and minor 
rating agencies. 
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